Name: Systemic Risk, International Regulation, and the Limits of Coordination (en Inglés)
SKU: 57697469
Price: 478.58 MXN
Availability: InStock
Author: Federal Reserve Board
ISBN: 9781503283459

portada Systemic Risk, International Regulation, and the Limits of Coordination (en Inglés)

Systemic Risk, International Regulation, and the Limits of Coordination (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Createspace

Autor

Federal Reserve Board

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

27.9x21.6x0.3 cm

Peso

0.17 kg.

ISBN13

9781503283459

Categorías

Empresa y gestión

Systemic Risk, International Regulation, and the Limits of Coordination (en Inglés)

Federal Reserve Board (Autor) · Createspace · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Systemic Risk, International Regulation, and the Limits of Coordination (en Inglés)"

This study examines the incentives of national regulators to coordinate regulatory policies in the presence of systemic risk in global financial markets. In a two-country and three-period model, correlated asset fire sales by banks generate systemic risk across national financial mar- kets. Relaxing regulatory standards in one country increases both the cost and the severity of crises for both countries in this framework. In the absence of coordination, independent regulators choose inefficiently low levels of macro-prudential regulation. A central regulator internalizes the systemic risk and thereby can improve the welfare of coordinating countries. Symmetric countries always benefit from coordination. Asymmetric countries choose different levels of macro-prudential regulation when they act independently. Common central regulation will voluntarily emerge only between sufficiently similar countries.