Name: Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics: Volume 25, Part 1 Paperback: V. 25 (Social Philosophy and Policy) (en Inglés)
SKU: 2003089
Price: 1190.41 MXN
Availability: InStock
Author: Paul, Ellen Frankel ; Miller Jr, Fred ; Paul, Jeffrey
ISBN: 9780521719636

portada Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics: Volume 25, Part 1 Paperback: V. 25 (Social Philosophy and Policy) (en Inglés)

Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics: Volume 25, Part 1 Paperback: V. 25 (Social Philosophy and Policy) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Ilustrado por

Ellen Frankel Paul

Fred Miller Jr

Jeffrey Paul

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Autor

Paul, Ellen Frankel ; Miller Jr, Fred ; Paul, Jeffrey

Año

2008

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

442

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

22.6x15x2.3 cm

Peso

0.59 kg.

ISBN

0521719631

ISBN13

9780521719636

Categorías

Filosofía ética y moral
Filosofía social y política

Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics: Volume 25, Part 1 Paperback: V. 25 (Social Philosophy and Policy) (en Inglés)

Ellen Frankel Paul (Ilustrado por) · Fred Miller Jr (Ilustrado por) · Jeffrey Paul (Ilustrado por) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics: Volume 25, Part 1 Paperback: V. 25 (Social Philosophy and Policy) (en Inglés)"

Do we desire things because they are good, or are they good because we desire them? Objectivists answer that we desire things because they are good; subjectivists answer that things are good because we desire them. Further, does it make sense to account for moral disagreement by claiming, as the moral relativist does, that something might be good for one person but not for another? Some essays in this book consider whether objective moral truths can be grounded in an understanding of the nature of human beings as rational and social animals. Some discuss the ethical theories of historical figures--Aristotle, Aquinas, or Kant--or offer critical assessments of the work of recent and contemporary theorists--such as Moore, Putnam, Ayn Rand, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse. Other essays ask whether moral principles and values can be constructed through a process of practical reasoning or deliberation. Still others consider what the phenomenology of our moral experiences can reveal about moral objectivity.