Name: Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics Hardback (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (en Inglés)
SKU: 49712845
Price: 3281.82 MXN
Availability: InStock
Author: Adolph, Christopher
ISBN: 9781107032613

portada Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics Hardback (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (en Inglés)

Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics Hardback (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Christopher Adolph

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Año

2013

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

390

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

Dimensiones

23.6x15.5x2.5 cm

Peso

0.66 kg.

ISBN13

9781107032613

Categorías

Política comparada
Banca

Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics Hardback (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (en Inglés)

Christopher Adolph (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Dura

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Reseña del libro "Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics Hardback (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (en Inglés)"

Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.